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INTRODUCTION 
Selling counterfeit goods, especially replicas of expensive designer 
accessories, is rampant around the world. In fact, the International 
Chamber of Commerce estimates that, by 2015, the value of counterfeit 
goods around the world will exceed $1.7 trillion.
1
 In most big cities, 
visitors can find small shops or cardboard fold-up tables selling 
imitation luxury purses, scarves, watches, and sunglasses, and New 
York City is no exception. 
Designers of nearly every type of item—clothes, accessories, and 
electronics—create and use symbols, marks, and words that, over time, 
become synonymous with their brand and its quality, and eventually are 
afforded protection under trademark laws.
2
 Those who use these marks 
in connection with other goods without permission from the mark 
owner are in violation of trademark laws and are subject to civil and 
criminal penalties.
3
 Although the manufacturers and sellers of such 
counterfeit goods are arguably the “guiltiest” participants, countless 
counterfeit goods are purchased, used, and flaunted every day by people 
who know, or should know, that the goods are not genuine. 
Currently, there are no federal, state, or local laws that punish 
buyers of counterfeit goods. New York City in recent years has 
attempted to combat counterfeiting by punishing sellers, not buyers.
4
 In 
April 2011, New York City Councilwoman Margaret Chin proposed a 
local law that would impose criminal penalties, including possible jail 
time, for purchasers of counterfeit goods.
5
 Councilwoman Chin’s 
proposed legislation sets out two alternative mens rea requirements for a 
conviction under this proposed law: that the defendant either knew or 
should have known that the item bought was not genuine.
6
 The latter 
mens rea term, should have known, however, is not mentioned in New 
 
1 Steve Hargreaves, Counterfeit Goods Becoming More Dangerous, CNN MONEY (Sept. 
27, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/27/news/economy/counterfeit-goods/index.html. 
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. g (2012) (discussing the 
present breadth of trademark law). 
3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 
25:14, 25:15 (4th ed. 2011). 
4 Ross Tucker, Counterfeit Crackdown: New York Police Shutter Canal Street 
Buildings, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (Feb. 28, 2008), 
http://gibney.com/p/bb10a56b8c7e85544ea6ff9b8c5dab4b987a975f. 
5 Int. No. 544 § 10-902 (2011), available at 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=885894&GUID=926F900B-
7A1E-48E8-991D-6A3CFE24EA90&Options=&Search=.  
6 Int. No. 544 § 10-902(2). 
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York’s Penal Code and has not been clearly defined by New York 
courts. Despite this ambiguity, the law is beneficial because it is likely 
to substantially combat trademark infringement and the current vague 
understanding of the phrase “should have known” can easily be clarified 
by the legislation and future court opinions. 
Part I of this Note discusses theories of criminal punishment and 
the mens rea requirement in criminal law generally and under the New 
York Penal Code. Part II provides a background of trademark law, 
federal and New York state trademark regulation, and the requirements 
of trademark infringement actions. In Part III, this Note provides a 
factual background of the counterfeit goods market in New York City. 
Part IV introduces the proposed local law intended to provide a source 
for criminal actions against purchasers of counterfeit goods in New 
York City. Finally, Parts V and VI analyze the mens rea requirements of 
the proposed New York City legislation, examine similar laws in other 
U.S. states and foreign countries, and discuss why the proposed law 
comports with theories of criminal punishment and public policy. 
I. The Mens Rea Requirement in Criminal Law 
A. Theories of Criminal Punishment 
Criminal law is meant to punish wrongdoing.
7
 Punishment can be 
manifested in a variety of ways, including fines, community service, 
imprisonment, or even the death penalty.
8
 The two dominant 
justifications for punishment arise from two divergent penological 
theories: retributivism (or deontology) and utilitarianism.
9
 These 
theories postulate that punishment is justified by the public’s perceived 
desire to punish wrongdoers (retributivism) and its need to punish 
criminals in order to deter future criminal behavior (utilitarianism).
10
 
One authority succinctly described the difference in the theories as 
follows: “a retributivist claims that punishment is justified because 
people deserve it; a utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful 
 
7 John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (2009).  
8 SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (8th ed. 2007). 
9 Matthew Haist, Comment: Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian 
Goals Achievable In a World of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
789, 793 (2009). 
10 Hasnas, supra note 7, at 1336. 
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purposes that punishment serves.”
11
 
The retributive theory is based on the traditional “eye-for-an-eye” 
concept that seeks to justify punishment based on the offender’s moral 
culpability.
12
 The nineteenth century English judge and proponent of 
retributivism, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, stated that, “the infliction of 
punishment by law gives definite expression and a solemn ratification 
and justification to the hatred which is excited by the commission of the 
offence[.]”
13
 This theory also reflects society’s desire to punish those 
who violate the law and is rooted in morality.
14
 It assumes that all people 
are moral actors capable of making good versus evil choices.
15
 Those 
who follow the retributivist school of thought also believe that it is not 
only morally better if a wrongdoer is punished than if he is not, but that 
retributivism imposes a duty on society to punish.
16
 In fact, scholars 
have asserted that society’s act of punishing a wrongdoer is not only 
reasonably good, but morally good.
17
 
Retributivists have set forth several different sub-theories. Some 
retributivists believe that there is a delicate balance between the benefits 
and burdens of living in a society that relies on each member’s respect 
for the rights of others.
18
 When the law is broken, the balance is 
disrupted.
19
 The condemnation of punishment, however, takes away any 
advantage gained through the misconduct and restores the benefit-
burden balance.
20
 For other retributivists, laws serve a morally educative 
purpose and persuade citizens to act a certain way.
21
 Punishment not 
only reaffirms this moral code, but not punishing a wrongdoer would 
 
11 Kent Greenawalt, Commentary: Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 
(1st ed. 1983). 
12 KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 79. 
13 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 81-82 
(1883), available at 
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=apbaAAAAMAAJ&rdid=book-
apbaAAAAMAAJ&rdot=1. 
14 Haist, supra note 9, at 795; Hasnas, supra note 7, at 1336. 
15 RICHARD J. BONNIE, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 7 (3d ed. 2010). 
16 Todd R. Clear, Harm in American penology: offenders, victims, and their 
communities 9 (1994); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in 
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). 
17 HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976); H. L. A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 231-32 (1968). 
18 Clear, supra note 16, at 9 (citing Kant (1887)). 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 10. 
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itself be immoral.
22
 Others simply view laws as prohibiting immoral 
acts.
23
 Because U.S. citizens are free to make their own decisions, if 
someone makes a morally bad decision, society condemns that decision 
and demands punishment.
24
 Punishment not only makes the 
condemnation tangible, but it also symbolizes the moral reprehensibility 
of the act.
25
 
Because retributivists believe punishment must be deserved,
26
 
maintaining proportionality between a crime and its punishment is 
crucial.
27
 This requires an assessment of the moral culpability of the 
wrongdoer based on the severity of the crime.
28
 Today’s criminal system 
implements proportionality by grading offenses using a degree system 
and by labeling crimes as either misdemeanors or felonies.
29
 
Although the majority of scholarship today focuses on 
retributivism, today’s criminal justice system is largely based on the 
work and beliefs of eighteenth century utilitarian reformers.
30
 The main 
goal of utilitarianism is to increase the net happiness of society.
31
 
Criminal punishment accomplishes this by setting an example for 
society and preventing future offenses through deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
32
 
Deterrence is effectuated when the threat of punishment prevents a 
would-be criminal from engaging in illegal activity because the cost of 
punishment outweighs the benefit of committing the crime.
33
 In other 
words, when one wishes to avoid punishment to a sufficient extent, he 
will not commit a crime. Thus, the deterrence theory suggests that 
greater penalties will lead to less crime by raising the cost of 
committing the crime. Deterrence theory applies to both past criminals, 
whose unpleasant punishment deters them from committing another 
 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Haist, supra note 9, at 793-94. 
25 Clear, supra note 16, at 10. 
26 JOHN KAPLAN, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 32 (6th ed. 2008). 
27 MORRIS, supra note 17, at 33-34; HART, supra note 17, at 231-32. 
28 BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 12. 
29 Id. 
30 KAPLAN, ET AL., supra note 26, at 31. 
31 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14 (4th ed. 2006); Haist, supra 
note 9, at 794. 
32 BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 3; Haist, supra note 9, at 794; Moore, supra note 16, 
at 179. 
33 Haist, supra note 9, at 794; KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 92. 
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crime, and would-be criminals, who are deterred by the threat of 
punishment without ever having experienced it. 
Incapacitation involves the simple idea of protecting the public by 
physically preventing criminals from committing additional crimes.
34
 
Facilities like jails and prisons are designed and operated for this 
purpose.
35
 In fact, despite the high costs, some argue that prisons “pay 
big dividends” because of a prison’s ability to incapacitate criminals.
36
 
Rehabilitation involves two goals: first, to make criminals safe to 
return to society to make the streets safer, and, second, to rehabilitate 
criminals so that they can not only return to society, but so that they can 
lead productive, successful lives in the general public.
37
 In fact, studies 
indicate that rehabilitation is effective in achieving these societal goals.
38
 
In reality, the American criminal system is a composite of these 
and other penological theories.
39
 Different punishment justifications are 
exercised at different times.
40
 The New York Penal Code, for example, 
states multiple reasons for its outlined punishments: 
The general purposes of the provisions of this chapter are . . . [t]o 
insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses 
through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the 
rehabilitation of those convicted . . . and their confinement when 
required in the interests of public protection.
41
 
Seemingly contrary to the Constitution’s promises of freedom,
42
 
criminal law permits the government to take away a person’s freedom 
and property—and sometimes their life—both metaphorically and 
 
34 KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 101-02 (citing FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT 
OF CRIME (9th ed. 1995) (arguing that incapacitation is the central objective of criminal 
punishment)). 
35 Id. at 101. 
36 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Prisons are a Bargain, by Any Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
1996, at A17, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/1996/01/16crime-
john-j-diiulio-jr (positing that, despite high prison costs, the price of imprisoning a man is 
half that society would pay if he were let free). 
37 KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 98. 
38 See id. at 99-101. 
39 BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. 
40 Id. 
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (Consol. 2013). 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
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literally.
43
 Because wrongful convictions are inherent in the legal 
system, and because U.S. citizens place a high value on the rights to life 
and liberty, the U.S. has historically been wary of criminalizing acts for 
fear of wrongfully depriving an innocent person of his rights.
44
 This idea 
is based on William Blackstone’s famous statement that “it is better that 
ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”
45
 Thus, before a 
criminal law is enacted, the purpose and value of the law and resultant 
criminal punishment must be evaluated and compared with the 
harmfulness of the wrongful act. Only then can it be determined if it is 
logical to enact the new law. 
B. Mens Rea in New York 
Almost every criminal law has two main elements, an actus reus 
and a mens rea. Actus reus requires that a voluntary act or omission has 
occurred.
46
 Mens rea requires that the actor possessed a culpable state of 
mind.
47
 Because of the nature of criminal punishment and the general 
caution typically exercised before enacting a criminal law, any potential 
holes or uncertainties in these elements will make a law less than ideal. 
The requisite level of mens rea varies by crime and 
jurisdiction.
48
Although not adopted word-for-word, the mens rea 
standards in New York’s Penal Code are based on the Model Penal 
Code (“MPC”).
49
 New York divides culpability into four levels of 
mental states: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and criminal 
negligence.
50
 The highest level, “intentionally,” is present when a person 
acts with the “conscious objective” to cause a specific result or to act as 
 
43 Hasnas, supra note 7, at 1335. 
44 Id. at 1335-36. 
45 Id. at 1335 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 359 (Wayne Morrison ed., Routledge-Cavendish 2001) (1769)).  
46 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01. 
47 Id. § 2.02; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 37 (2012); 35 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: 
Substantive Principles and Offenses §§ 21-22 (2012). Some crimes, such as statutory rape, 
are strict liability crimes that do not have a mens rea element.  
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (describing varying levels of culpable mental states); 35 
N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Substantive Principles and Offenses §§ 21-22 (2012). 
49 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02; Paul H. Robinson & Marckus Dirk Dubber, An 
Introduction to the Model Penal Code 3 (1999), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf. 
50 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05. In contrast, the MPC uses the four mental states of 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2). 
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he did.
51
 New York’s “intentionally” standard is essentially equivalent to 
the MPC’s “purposely” mens rea standard.
52
 The next level of mens rea 
in New York, referred to as “knowingly,” occurs when a person is 
“aware” of the connection between his conduct or the circumstances and 
the offense.
53
 A very fine line separates the “knowingly” and 
“intentionally” standards.
54
 While “intentionally” requires a conscious 
objective to cause a result by specific conduct, “knowingly” requires 
merely an awareness that the result is practically certain to result from 
conduct.
55
 
The third level of mental culpability in New York is “recklessly.”
56
 
This occurs when “[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a [criminal] 
result or to a circumstance.”
57
 In cases of recklessness, the actor must 
have consciously disregarded a risk, and the risk must be so “substantial 
and unjustifiable” that it “constitutes a gross deviation” from the way a 
reasonable person would act under the same circumstances.
58
 
The final mens rea level in New York is criminal negligence.
59
 A 
person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a 
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to 
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or 
that such circumstance exists.
60
 The risk must be of such nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation.
61
 This final level of mens rea in New York is essentially the 
equivalent of the MPC’s “negligently” requirement.
62
 Some argue that 
negligent behavior, where the actor was not aware of a threat of 
punishment and did not act with a guilty mind, should never have penal 
 
51 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1). 
52 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a). 
53 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2). 
54 Paula Gormley, The New York State Penal Law: A Supplement to Professor Matthew 
Lippman’s Contemporary Criminal Law, First Edition, at 38, available at 
http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy/state/ny/ (last updated Aug. 2008). 
55 Id. 
56 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4). 
60 Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES PART I, at 229-44 (1985). 
61 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4). 
62 Compare id. with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). 
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consequences.
63
 
II. Trademark Law 
A. General Background 
Trademark law prohibits competitors from using marks in a way 
that will confuse consumers as to a good’s manufacturer or affiliation.
64
 
Such marks can be a word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination of these, that is used to indicate the source of a good or 
service.
65
 Trademark law aims to protect both valid trademark owners 
and the public.
66
 In passing the Lanham Act that regulates federal 
trademark law, Congress stated that the purpose of trademark regulation 
is two-fold: 
[first,] to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing 
a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, 
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get . . . [and 
s]econdly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, 
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in 
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
67
 
When successful, this allows consumers to rely on certain marks of a 
good to identify the source, and, thereby, to recognize other 
characteristics, such as the quality, of that good.
68
 This protects a 
trademark owner’s business in a variety of ways, including by 
preventing lost sales that result when others sell imitation items for less 
without having to invest in the development of the good.
69
 Trademark 
law also helps limit damage to a creator’s reputation through dilution.
70
 
 
63 BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 209 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES 
PART I, at 229-44 (1985)); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal 
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 634-37 (1963). 
64 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 2:2. 
65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9. 
66 Id. 
67 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3-4 (1946), available at 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/trademarks/PreLanhamAct_026_HR_1333.pdf; see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9. 
68 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (“To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public 
from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the 
advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion form (sic) those who 
have created them to those who have not.”). 
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9. 
70 Id. Dilution occurs when the strength of a mark’s association with the plaintiff creator 
or company is decreased and the mark’s good name or reputation is tarnished. Id. 
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The protection that trademark law affords creates incentives for 
manufacturers and retailers to create and produce new and inventive 
items for the public because they can trust that the law will protect their 
products and their ability to sell and make a profit.
71
 It also leads to a 
more efficient, competitive, and productive marketplace that benefits 
creators, sellers, and buyers alike.
72
 
B. Regulation of Trademark Law 
While federal law strictly regulates both patent law and copyright 
law, trademark law is the subject of both state and federal regulation.
73
 
The federal Lanham Act provides a means for creators to register 
trademarks with the federal Patent and Trademark Office and is a basis 
for relief for infringement, even in some situations in which a mark is 
unregistered.
74
 
Before the Act took effect in 1947, there was no federal trademark 
protection in the U.S. because it was unclear whether or not Congress 
had the power to regulate this area of law.
75
 In 1879, the Supreme Court 
decided In re Trade-Mark Cases and held that the federal government’s 
power to regulate trademark law stems from the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause and Congress’s power to “regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”
76
 
In general, however, the Lanham Act does not directly preempt 
state trademark law.
77
 Rather, states are granted the power to pass their 
 
71 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 2:3. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. §§ 5:3, 22:2. 
74 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1129 (2005); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 5:4. 
75 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 5:3. In fact, in In re Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress does not have power to regulate trademarks under the 
Constitution’s patent and copyright clause. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; In re 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)). 
76 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94-95 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3). 
77 E.g., Colonial Penn Grp., Inc. v. Colonial Deposit Co., 834 F.2d 229, 234 n.3 (1st Cir. 
1987); Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir. 1987); Keebler 
Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980); La Chemise Lacoste v. 
Alligator Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1974) (White, J., dissenting). However, while 
state law can expand trademark rights, it cannot narrow or usurp federal rights, nor can it be 
incongruous with Congress’s intent in enacting the Lanham Act. See e.g., Purolator, Inc. v. 
EFRA Distribs., Inc., 687 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 
347 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 22:2. 
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own trademark laws as part of the general police powers granted by the 
U.S. Constitution, a protection that falls within unfair competition 
laws.
78
 Under New York state law, as under the federal Lanham Act, all 
that is required to bring an action for unfair competition based on a 
trademark is a likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.
79
 In a pre-
Lanham Act opinion, the New York State Supreme Court Appellate 
Division held that an alleged counterfeiter is liable “if the resemblance 
is such as to deceive a purchaser of ordinary caution, or if it is 
calculated to deceive the careless and unwary; and thus . . . injure[s] the 
sale of the goods of the proprietor of the trade mark [sic].”
80
 
C. Trademark Infringement 
A successful trademark infringement suit requires the plaintiff to 
prove two elements under both Federal and New York law.
81
 First, the 
defendant must have made use of the trademark by reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any good or service 
without consent from the trademark holder.
82
 The requirement generally 
means that the defendant must have closely associated the mark with 
goods or services he was advertising or selling.
83
 Second, the plaintiff 
must show that this use is likely to “cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive.”
84
 There are a variety of factors that a court can 
consider in determining if this element is fulfilled, including the 
similarity of the marks in sight, sound, and/or meaning, the manner of 
presenting the mark, the strength of plaintiff’s mark, the similarity and 
sophistication of prospective purchasers, the cost of the goods, the 
similarity of marketing channels, the alleged infringer’s good faith, the 
defendant’s interest in entering the plaintiff’s market by using the mark, 
and any evidence of actual confusion.
85
 Which factors are evaluated 
 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. X; MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 5:3. 
79 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-k (Consol. 2013); Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. 
Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977). 
80 Charles S. Cash, Inc. v. Steinbook, 220 A.D. 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927). 
81 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005). 
82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20. 
83 See id.; see also A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 
198, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2000); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 
(6th Cir. 1982) (citing AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979)).  
84 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
85 E.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961); see also 
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varies in every jurisdiction, but courts always employ at least a few in 
their assessment.
86
 Despite the many similarities between New York’s 
trademark laws and the Lanham Act, there is at least one significant 
difference: although federal law requires the mark to acquire secondary 
meaning before it is afforded trademark protection, this is not a 
requirement for an unfair competition trademark action in New York.
87
 
Furthermore, under New York penal law, there are three classes of 
trademark counterfeiting—A, C, and E—and the degree depends on the 
retail value of the good.
88
 The relevant section of the Penal Code states 
that: 
[a] person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting . . . when, with the 
intent to deceive or defraud some other person or with the intent to 
evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, offering for sale, or 
distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or 
offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or 
possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit for the purpose of 
affixing it to any goods.
89
 
Despite clearly criminalizing the creation or sale of counterfeit goods, 
the New York Penal Code makes no explicit reference to placing 
criminal penalties on those who purchase or merely possess counterfeit 
goods.
90
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20; A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s 
Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy, 
Inc., 670 F.2d at 647, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th 
Cir.1979). 
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20. 
87 Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
88 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.71-165.73. A crime is a class A misdemeanor where the 
value of the counterfeited goods is less than one thousand dollars, a class E felony where the 
value is between one thousand dollars and one hundred thousand dollars, and a class C 
felony where the value exceeds one hundred thousand dollars. Id. New York’s penal law 
also provides for the seizure and destruction of counterfeit goods upon conviction of the 
counterfeiter. Id. § 165.74. In New York, a class A misdemeanor carries a possible prison 
term of up to one year. Id. § 70.15(1). A class E felony carries a possible prison term of up 
to four years. Id. § 70.00(2). A class C felony carries a possible prison sentence of up to 
fifteen years. Id. 
89 Id. § 165.71; see also id. §§ 165.72, 165.73. 
90 Id. § 165.71. 
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There are numerous defenses that can be used to avoid liability 
once a plaintiff proves the elements of his trademark infringement 
claim. Defenses include fair use, consent, abandonment, and equitable 
common-law defenses such as laches and unclean hands.
91
 In a 
successful trademark infringement action, a trademark owner may be 
awarded an injunction or monetary recovery, including actual damages 
for injury and the amount of the defendant’s profits, or both.
92
 
III. The Practice of Selling Counterfeit Goods in New York 
City 
Vendors in New York City sell counterfeit goods in small shops, 
from makeshift stalls along the street, and even from blankets laid out 
on sidewalks. This practice has made New York City, especially along 
Canal Street in Chinatown in Lower Manhattan, notorious as a major 
hub of counterfeit operations in the United States if not the world.
93
 The 
goods sold in New York City range from fake clothes to accessories, 
including purses, watches, jewelry, and scarves, to luggage and 
electronics. 
Despite the illegality of the practice, tourist sites for visitors to 
New York City peddle counterfeit goods shopping. For example, the 
website NYC.com describes Canal Street as “an amazing open-air 
bazaar,” and further explains to readers that “[i]f you’re wondering why 
some of the dealers keep their most prized goods in attaché cases, it’s 
because of frequent raids by US Customs and the New York City police 
targeting dealers in counterfeit items.”
94
 Another website, New York 
Show Tickets, further explains to tourists—and, presumably, locals— 
where to buy imitation purses and how to spot a good-quality 
counterfeit handbag.
95
 Despite touting this advice, the New York Show 
 
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28-32. 
92 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2). 
93 Aubrey Fox, The High Price of Counterfeit Goods, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 2008), 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/crime/20080331/4/2476; Sara Kugler, NYC Police 
Seize Over $1M in Fake Goods, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2008), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-26-3240627089_x.htm. 
94 Canal Street – Editorial Review, NYC.COM, 
http://www.nyc.com/arts__attractions/canal_street.1312/editorial_review.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2013). 
95 Guide to Buying Fake Handbags in New York City, N.Y. SHOW TICKETS, 
http://www.nytix.com/NewYorkCity/articles/handbags.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). It 
should be noted, however, that other, arguably more upstanding websites, such as New York 
Magazine, do not tout similar advice. In fact, a search ran in March 2012 on New York 
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Tickets article does include a section entitled, “The Ethical Dilemma of 
Buying A Fake Handbag.”
96
 However, the website does little to dissuade 
potential buyers, and in fact states that, “[f]or the buyer, there is little 
risk of prosecution, as no one has ever been charged in New York City 
for buying a fake handbag, even though it is an illegal act.”
97
 
In recent years, officials in New York have attempted to crack 
down on this growing industry via the Office of Special Enforcement 
created by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2006 to 
combat various “quality of life issues.”
98
 Between 2003 and 2005, 
authorities seized over forty-five million dollars in counterfeit goods in 
midtown Manhattan in New York City.
99
 In 2006, police confiscated 
more than twenty-five million dollars in counterfeit goods, issued 
seventy-five warrants, and made almost one hundred arrests.
100
 In 2007, 
seven locations selling counterfeit goods were closed and five hundred 
thousand dollars in fines was collected by the city.
101
 During the 2007 
raids, the products seized included everything from DVDs and 
computer games to apparel.
102
 
In February 2008, police raided three buildings in Chinatown and 
confiscated more than one million dollars in counterfeit goods, the 
majority of which were handbags, scarves, belts, watches, and 
perfumes.
103
 Mayor Bloomberg called the raid location “one of the most 
notorious knockoff shopping malls in the five boroughs.”
104
 This area in 
Chinatown has been dubbed the “Counterfeit Triangle;” it is comprised 
 
Magazine’s Chinatown neighborhood guide revealed little mention of the counterfeit goods 
market. The Everything Guide to Chinatown, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Feb. 11, 2007), 
http://nymag.com/guides/everything/27795/. 
96 Guide to Buying Fake Handbags in New York City, supra note 95. 
97 Id. 
98 Mayor’s Office of Special Enforcement, NYC.GOV, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cjc/html/quality/mose.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). See 
generally Tucker, supra note 4. 
99 Tucker, supra note 4. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Sewell Chan, City Raids “Counterfeit Triangle,” Shutting 32 Storefronts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2008), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/26/city-raids-counterfeit-
triangle-shutting-32-storefronts/; Kugler, supra note 93; Jefferson Siegel, Police Bust 
“Counterfeit Triangle” on Canal St.; 32 Stores Padlocked, THE VILLAGER (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://thevillager.com/villager_252/policebustcounterfeit.html. 
104 Siegel, supra note 103. 
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of a group of several buildings, all owned by the same landlord.
105
 The 
buildings house thirty-two shops that sell counterfeit goods and operate 
over ten hours per day, seven days per week, and employ over 150 
people.
106
 The February 2008 raid uncovered additional storage rooms 
and backroom retail operations in the Triangle.
107
 
The crusade against the counterfeit goods market in New York 
City shows no signs of slowing down. In July 2011, Apple, Inc. filed a 
lawsuit against two stores, Fun Zone and Apple Story, in Queens, NY, 
alleging that the stores sell accessories for Apple products branded with 
the Apple, Inc. logo and other protected Apple marks.
108
 Although the 
stores maintain that they did not violate trademark laws, a court-ordered 
settlement compelled the stores to hand over their infringing products; 
Apple Story was also required to change its name.
109
 Most recently, 
nearly fifty vendors were arrested in Chinatown for selling goods they 
allegedly believed were genuine.
110
 During a press conference after the 
February 2008 raid, Mayor Bloomberg stated that “[t]his is the wrong 
place to come if you want to buy stolen merchandise. We are not a place 
that engages in criminal activity.”
111
 
 
105 Chan, supra note 103; Kugler, supra note 93; Siegel, supra note 103; Tucker, supra 
note 4. 
106 Siegel, supra note 103; Tucker, supra note 4. 
107 Tucker, supra note 4. 
108 Complaint at 8-11, Apple, Inc. v. Apple Story, Inc., No. 11-3550 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 
2011), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nyedce/1:2011cv03550/320338/1/; Apple Moves Against Knockoffs in New York, 
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2011, 7:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/18/apple-
knockoffs-idUSN1E77H1Y920110818. 
109 Consent Order of Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against Defendants at 3, 4, 
Apple, Inc. v. Apple Story, Inc., No. 11-3550 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nyedce/1:2011cv03550/320338/33/; Apple Settles With Queens Stores Over Knockoffs, 
REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/applestory-
settlement-idUSS1E78E1LV20110915. 
110 Justin Chan, Chinatown Vendors Angry About “Angry Birds” Arrests, VOICES OF 
N.Y. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://voicesofny.org/2012/03/chinatown-vendors-angry-about-angry-
birds-arrests/. 
111 Tucker, supra note 4. 
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IV. Proposal to Criminalize purchasing counterfeit goods in 
New York City 
A. General Background 
In April 2011, at a New York City council meeting, council 
member Margaret Chin, whose district includes Chinatown, proposed a 
local law (“Intro 544”) to amend the New York City administrative 
code to criminalize the purchase of counterfeit goods.
112
 The proposed 
legislation, which is currently under review, would make purchasing a 
counterfeit good a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, jail time, or 
both.
113
 Ms. Chin hopes the law will be enacted by the end of 2013.
114
 
The aim of Intro 544 is to deter people from purchasing illegal 
counterfeit goods that infringe on the trademark rights of other items in 
the marketplace. Ms. Chin also believes that the legislation will stop 
tourists from coming to Chinatown to buy counterfeit goods, and that 
they will instead visit Chinatown for other, more respectable reasons.
115
 
In fact, in May 2011, the two community boards that cover the majority 
of Ms. Chin’s District 1—Community Board No. 1 and Community 
Board No. 2
116
—voted in support of Intro 544.
117
 Furthermore, 
 
112 Int. No. 544 § 10-902; John Farley, Debate on City’s Counterfeit Goods Bill 
Continues, THIRTEEN (July 10, 2011, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.thirteen.org/metrofocus/news/2011/07/debate-on-citys-counterfeit-goods-bill-
continues/. 
113 Int. No. 544 § 10-902. 
114 Narine Khngikyan, Buying Counterfeit Goods is Just No Good!, CONSUMER 
ADVOCATE LEGAL UPDATE (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.consumeradvocatelegalupdate.com/2012/05/articles/consumer-fraud/buying-
counterfeit-goods-is-just-no-good/. 
115 Farley, supra note 112. 
116 New York City is made up of fifty-nine community boards, which are community 
organizations that represent the interests of their community residents on a variety of issues, 
including sanitation and street maintenance, zoning, and development and planning. Home, 
CMTY. BD. NO. 1, http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb1/html/home/home.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2013). Community Board No. 1 covers nearly all of lower Manhattan below Canal 
Street. Kasey LaFlam, Community Board #1 Map, CMTY. BD. NO. 1, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb1/downloads/misc/Community_Board_1_Map.jpg (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2013). Community Board No. 2 is bound by Canal Street, 14th Street, 
Bowery, and the Hudson River, and includes the New York City neighborhoods of 
Greenwich Village, South Village, SoHo, NoHo, Little Italy, Chinatown, Hudson Square, 
and Gansevoort Market. Home, CMTY. BD. NO. 2, www.cb2manhattan.org (last visited Apr. 
19, 2013). 
117 Biography of Margaret Chin, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, 
http://council.nyc.gov/d1/html/members/biography.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); 
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Community Board No. 2 adopted a resolution in support of Intro 544, in 
which it stated that the sale of counterfeit goods on and around Canal 
Street in Chinatown has been a “serious issue over many years.”
118
 The 
Community Board further stated that the illegal activity has led to 
threatening behavior towards and the physical assault of local 
residents and police officers by vendors, [and] a proliferation in other 
criminal activity in the area . . . . [It also] impedes pedestrian traffic 
on sidewalks and in crosswalks, blocks building access and egress, 
and contributes to sanitation issues and other quality of life issues.
119
 
The Board and other proponents of Intro 544, including neighboring 
Community Board No. 1, cite additional economic and ethical reasons 
for their support of the legislation.
120
 They claim that the selling of 
counterfeit goods has been connected to other organized crimes, such as 
human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism.
121
 The industry uses 
child labor, causes harm to other legitimate local businesses, and has led 
to over one billion dollars in lost tax revenue and 750,000 lost jobs in 
New York City.
122
 
 
Kristoff Grospe, Proposed Law Targets Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods, 18 CITY LAW 1 
(2012). Board 1 voted twenty-two to thirteen in favor of the proposed legislation, while 
Board 2 voted unanimously in favor of the proposed legislation. Grospe, supra. Shortly 
before the publication of this Note, Ms. Chin and lower-Manhattan residents petitioned for a 
hearing on Intro 544. Kate Briquelet, Tourists Beware: Councilwoman Wants to Make it a 
Crime to Buy Knockoff Handbags, N.Y. POST (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:49 AM), available at 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/knock_it_off_shoppers_S0C161DwzGrvsC
xsLwujwM. Additionally, area residents and members of The First Precinct Community 
Council initiated an online petition through the non-profit service SignOn.org in an effort to 
garner support for passing the proposed law. Please Sign to Help Make it Illegal to Buy 
Counterfeit Trademarked Goods, THE FIRST PRECINCT CMTY. COUNCIL (Apr. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.1stprecinctcc.org/please-sign-to-help-make-it-illegal-to-buy-
counterfeit-trademarked-goods/. 
118 Resolution in Support of Intro 544, CMTY. BD. NO. 2, May 26, 2011, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb2/downloads/pdf/monthly_cb2_resolutions/may_2011/05_
may2011_environment.pdf. 
119 Id. 
120 Id.; Home, CMTY. BD. NO. 1, supra note 116. 
121 Resolution in Support of Intro 544, supra note 118; see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA & 
KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41547, ORGANIZED CRIME: AN EVOLVING 
CHALLENGE FOR U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 3-5 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41547.pdf (citing the counterfeit goods market as a new 
avenue of illegal activity linked to organized crime). In fact, New York Magazine labels 
Chinatown a “crime epicenter” rife with a “massive scale of heroin importing, human 
smuggling, prostitution, illegal gambling” in addition to its counterfeit goods market. 
Dimitri Ehrlich, The Enduring Micro-City, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Feb. 11, 2007), 
http://nymag.com/guides/everything/chinatown/27779/. 
122 Resolution in Support of Intro 544, supra note 118; Farley, supra note 112; Fox, 
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Opponents of Intro 544, however, fear that, if passed, the law 
would be detrimental to the local community.
123
 The opponents believe 
that New York City residents and tourists go to Chinatown to buy fake 
goods, but that they also spend money at local restaurants, grocery 
stores, and other legitimate local businesses, and that the criminalization 
of purchasing counterfeit goods will negatively impact the local 
economy.
124
 Moreover, critics of the legislation worry that its passage 
will have a detrimental effect on the area’s small business owners and 
residents, especially its poorest residents, because this industry is so 
ingrained in the local economy in Chinatown.
125
 While Ms. Chin hopes 
that tourists will flock to Chinatown to visit its other worthy attractions, 
many fear that the neighborhood simply will not have enough left to 
lure visitors.
126
 
As proposed, Intro 544 prohibits the actus reus of buying a 
“tangible item containing a counterfeit trademark.”
127
 The proposed law 
will apply to any trademark “registered, filed, or recorded” under the 
laws of New York, any other U.S. state, or with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office.
128
 If passed, violating Intro 544 would be a Class 
A misdemeanor, punishable by a criminal penalty of up to one year in 
jail and a fine of up to one thousand dollars, a civil penalty of a fine of 
up to one thousand dollars, or both.
129
 Each object or good purchased 
can be considered a separate violation under the legislation.
130
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
supra note 93. 
123 Farley, supra note 112. 
124 Id.; Ashley Parker, Bill Aims to Make Buying Fake Designer Brands a Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/nyregion/bill-aims-to-make-
buying-fake-goods-a-crime-in-new-york.html. 
125 Farley, supra note 112; Parker, supra note 124. 
126 Farley, supra note 112; Parker, supra note 124. 
127 Int. No. 544 § 10-902(a). 
128 Id. § 10-901(c). 
129 Id. § 10-902(b)(1). 
130 Id. § 10-902(b)(2). 
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B. Mens Rea Requirements 
Intro 544 uses two alternative mens rea terms to define the 
requisite mental state necessary for the crime of purchasing counterfeit 
goods: “knows or should have known” that the goods were 
counterfeit.
131
 The first term, knows, is relatively straightforward and 
corresponds to the knowingly standard in the New York Penal Code.
132
 
It requires actual knowledge, or that, at the time of purchase, the actor is 
essentially certain the good is counterfeit.
133
 
Understanding the requisite mental state necessary for the second 
standard, “should have known,” is more complicated, and consequently 
creates an obstacle for Intro 544’s effectiveness. The phrase “should 
have known” is not a mens rea standard set out in the New York Penal 
Code.
134
 Intro 544, however, states that, in New York City, the quality 
and price of the item, the condition of the seller and the store, and the 
store location indicate or should indicate to the buyer that the item is 
counterfeit.
135
 Thus, when interpreting the plain meaning of the phrase 
“should have known,” the standard implies negligent behavior as 
defined by New York Penal Code section 15.05(4).
136
 New York courts, 
however, have held that “should have known” should be interpreted as a 
recklessness standard.
137
 For instance, in a 2009 patent case before the 
 
131 Id. § 10-902(a).  
132 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2). 
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 Int. No. 544 § 10-902(a). 
136 Andrew M. Stengel, Criminal Culpability’s Wild Mens Rea: Use and Misuse of 
“Willful” in the Laws of New York, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 779, 804-05 (2011); see also G. 
Robert Blakely and Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning 
and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under 
RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1621 app. D (1996) (equating the “should have known” 
standard with negligence). 
137 People v. Martin, 71 A.D.2d 928, 930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (holding that, because 
the defendant knew or should have known that the victim posed no danger, he acted 
recklessly or with criminal negligence when shooting the victim). But see People v. Joseph, 
172 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1958) (holding that “the recklessness requisite in a culpable negligence 
manslaughter case requires proof of ‘knowledge’ or conscious awareness of risk. Evidence 
which tends to prove that the defendant ‘should have known’ is admissible to prove actual 
knowledge.”). In a 1996 case, a New York State Appellate Division court held that “[a] 
violation of Labor Law § 220 is willful if the contractor acted ‘knowingly, intentionally or 
deliberately’, and a contractor acts knowingly if it ‘knew or should have known’ that it was 
violating the prevailing wage law.” Baywood Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 649 
N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Tenalp Constr. Corp. v. 
Roberts, 141 A.D.2d 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)). 
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Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the concurring opinion criticized the 
“should have known” standard as a simple negligence standard, “lower 
even than the ‘gross negligence’ standard.”
138
 As a result of this 
ambiguity and without further clarification of the meaning of the phrase 
“should have known,” Intro 544 will be difficult to interpret, predict, 
and apply, thus limiting the proposed law’s effectiveness. 
C. Similar Laws in Other Jurisdictions 
Georgia’s state code is the only one in the United States that could 
be interpreted as intending to punish purchasers of counterfeit goods. It 
imposes sanctions upon “[a]ny person . . . who purchases and keeps or 
has in his or her possession with the intent to sell or resell any goods he 
or she knows or should have known bear a forged or counterfeit 
trademark . . . .”
139
 It is unclear, however, whether the mere purchase of 
a counterfeit good is sufficient for punishment under this statute, or if 
the buyer must also intend to sell or resell the item, and there appears to 
be no case law that addresses the issue. 
It may come as no surprise, however, that two of the world’s 
fashion capitals—France and Italy—have laws that criminalize the 
purchase of counterfeit goods. France, which is considered to have the 
strictest anti-counterfeiting laws in Europe, explicitly prohibits 
purchasing counterfeit goods.
140
 In France, a person can be fined or 
imprisoned for “bad faith possession” of counterfeit goods.
141
 The 
penalty for such an offense can be a fine of up to three hundred 
thousand euros (approximately $391,422 USD)
142
 and up to three years 
in jail for a person who “holds without legitimate reason, imports under 
all customs procedures or exports goods presented under a [sic] 
 
138 Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prods., 559 F.3d 1317, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, 
J., concurring). 
139 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-454(c) (West 2013). 
140 Amanda Silverman, Draconian or Just? Adopting the Italian Model of Imposing 
Administrative Fines on the Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 175, 199 (2009); Miles Socha & Sharon Edelson, Attacking Counterfeits: Wal-
Mart Unit Settles with Fendi Over Fakes, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (June 7, 2007), available 
at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/76788330/fakes_arresting_wwd2; Tourists Warned Over 
Fake Goods, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8215519.stm (last modified 
Aug. 22, 2009). 
141 Silverman, supra note 140, at 198-99 (citing Code de la propriete intellectuelle, art. 
716-10 (Fr.), translated in http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=36&r=2594). 
142 Id.; Tourists Warned Over Fake Goods, supra note 140. Conversion calculated on 
April 22, 2013 by www.xe.com. 
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infringing mark.”
143
 In 2007, Michael Burke, the CEO of the Italian-
based luxury brand Fendi, praised France’s criminal laws against 
counterfeit goods, which he says successfully deter tourists from buying 
such goods.
144
 
In Italy, France’s neighboring and fellow fashion-conscious 
country, manufacturing, buying, and selling counterfeit items is very 
common.
145
 The Italian intellectual property laws, especially those 
governing counterfeit goods, have changed and advanced considerably 
during the past ten years.
146
 Originally, it was a misdemeanor to 
purchase property of suspect origin.
147
 The law set out to punish 
“[a]nyone who, without previously ascertaining their legitimate origin, 
purchases or receives, by any title goods that, due to their quality, the 
personal condition of the seller or their price can reasonably be 
suspected to originate from a crime.”
148
 Violators could face up to six 
months in prison or a fine “not inferior to [€10.32].”
149
 Furthermore, 
anyone who is negligent in failing to ascertain the origin of a good 
“reasonably suspected to originate from a crime” could be subject to a 
minimal fine or jail time.
150
 
In 2005, Italy added a more specific provision.
151
 That law states 
that, 
unless the act amounts to an offence, the purchase or acceptance 
without previously ascertaining their legitimate origin, for any reason 
of objects which, because of their quality or because of the condition 
of the person offering them or because of the price, lead to believe 
[sic] that laws on the origin and source of the good and on 
intellectual property have been infringed . . . .
152
 
 
143 Silverman, supra note 140, at 198-99 (citing Code de la propriete intellectuelle, 
supra note 141, at art. 716-10). 
144 Socha & Edelson, supra note 140. 
145 Silverman, supra note 140, at 182-83. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 187. 
148 Id. (citing C.p. art. 712 (Italy), translated in Pier Luigi Roncaglia, Handling of 
Counterfeit Goods: A Hands-on Problem for the Italian Criminal System, 92 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1393, 1398-99 n.18 (2002)). 
149 Id. at 187. 
150 Id. 
151 Silverman, supra note 140, at 188-89. 
152 Id. at 188 (citing Decree-Law No. 80/05 of May 14, 2005, art. 1(7), Gazz. Uff. 
No.111, (May 14, 2005), translated in Societa Italiana Brevetti, New Anti-Counterfeiting 
Measures: Confiscation and Fines for Buyers of Fakes, UPDATES ON INTELLECTUAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY IN ITALY AND THE EU: TRADEMARKS (Italy), July 2005, at 1 
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A violation of this law is punishable by a fine of up to ten thousand 
euros (approximately $13,043 USD).
153
 Preliminary evidence indicates 
that Italian authorities have been successful in imposing the new laws, 
although it is unclear whether or not the laws have been effective in 
curtailing the counterfeit goods market. A 2007 report by Italy’s High 
Commissioner for the Fight Against Counterfeiting reported that there 
were 11,728 administrative fines and 12,283 administrative seizures in 
the first half of 2006 alone, indicating a high success rate of the 
provision.
154
 However, these statistics are not limited to end-consumers 
only, so it is unclear how truly effective this new measure has been in 
achieving its goals of decreasing demand for and production of 
counterfeit goods.
155
 Nonetheless, newspapers and travel websites have 
reported that both Italian residents and tourists have received very large 
fines for buying counterfeit goods.
156
 This is in stark contrast to New 
York City travel websites that promote counterfeit goods shopping as a 
tourist attraction.
157
 Perhaps if, instead of encouraging the sale and 
purchase of counterfeit goods, New York City travel websites 
discouraged such conduct, Intro 544 would be more effective. 
V. The Application of Intro 544’s Mens Rea Requirements 
Intro 544 imposes punishment for two different levels of mens rea: 
knowingly and should have known. The former is often used in criminal 
statutes, while the latter is used less so. Under the knowingly standard, 
the New York Penal Code requires that an actor have actual knowledge 
of the circumstances, his actions, and their consequences.
158
 Because 
“culpable” means the actor presently knows and knew at the time the 
act was done that he did something wrong, it is appropriate for the law 
 
[hereinafter Italian Decree-Law 80/05]). 
153 Italian Decree-Law 80/05, supra note 152; conversion calculated on April 22, 2013 
by www.xe.com. 
154 See Silverman, supra note 140, at 189. 
155 See id. 
156 Id. at 188, 219 (citing Ing Svata Zdenek, Fake Products: Foreign Tourists Fined 
10.000 for the Purchase of Goods of Dubious Origin, EUROPEAN CONSUMER CENTRE 
PRAGUE (July 31, 2006), http://www.mpo.cz/zprava20307, 
http://www.konsumenteuropa.se/Documents/Engelska/fake products.pdf) (Italy has 
streamlined the application of its law against purchasing counterfeit goods by most often 
applying the highest possible fine). 
157 See, e.g., Canal Street – Editorial Review, supra note 94; Guide to Buying Fake 
Handbags in New York City, supra note 95. 
158 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2). 
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to require, at a minimum, a knowing mens rea standard.
159
 
Some would argue, however, that Intro 544’s second mens rea 
requirement, should have known, is too low of a standard to impose 
criminal punishment from a retributivist perspective. Under the 
retributive theory, punishment should only be meted out when one 
subjectively has a guilty mind. However, as discussed below, one who 
purchases a good under suspicious circumstances can be said to be 
culpable for failing to recognize, or for recognizing and accepting, the 
risk that the good she is purchasing may be counterfeit. The “should 
have known” standard has a subjective component and looks to what the 
actor actually knew about the context of the situation in which he 
purchased the goods and whether those circumstances are sufficiently 
suspicious that the actor is guilty for not having heeded the warning 
written on the wall. 
Utilitarians, on the other hand, may argue that deterrence cannot 
occur unless one knows that she is doing something wrong. Though this 
is true, public education programs regarding the harm and criminality of 
dealing in counterfeit goods, as well as news of major arrests on the 
front page of the New York Times, will surely create deterrence. In fact, 
those who oppose Intro 544 often argue that the deterrence element will 
work too well and Chinatown will lose its ability to attract visitors if 
this illegal dealing is curtailed. 
There are several reasons why permitting criminal liability under a 
“should have known” standard is neither problematic nor inconsistent 
with criminal law. First, although the phrase “should have known” is 
not defined in the New York Penal Code,
160
 it can be given its plain 
meaning: the person did not actually know what she was doing nor did 
she understand the consequences of her actions, but that she 
nevertheless should have known based on an objective analysis of the 
circumstances.
161
 Moreover, the “should have known” standard is found 
 
159 Although not relevant to this Note, the knowing mens rea standard also includes the 
higher mens rea states of purposeful and intentional acts. 
160 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05. 
161 Note that the “should have known” standard is easier to satisfy than is the willful 
blindness standard, which requires the actor to intentionally avoid learning of wrongdoing in 
order to avoid legal consequences. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. 
Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011); United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002). Courts 
finding willful blindness sufficient to impose criminal sanctions have reasoned that a 
defendant who intentionally avoids learning of wrongdoing is as culpable as one who has 
actual knowledge of it. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2069. 
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in several instances of criminal punishment stemming from supervisory 
or contributory positions. Under “command responsibility” in 
international criminal law, a leader may be found guilty of international 
crimes for the acts of his subordinates if he “‘knew, or . . . should have 
known’ that crimes had been or were going to be committed.”
162
 The 
responsible corporate officer doctrine also imposes a “should have 
known” standard for criminal liability for environmental crime on 
corporate officers for violations of those they supervise.
163
 Finally, under 
U.S. copyright laws, courts have held that a contributory infringer 
should have known that the service allowed users to obtain copyrighted 
material.
164
 
Second, many jurisdictions open the punishment door to lower 
levels of mental culpability. Indeed, the New York Penal Code lists both 
recklessness and criminal negligence as potential mens rea standards for 
criminal punishment, both of which permit punishment without actual 
knowledge that one is doing something wrong.
165
 Criminal negligence 
entails risk taking, and Intro 544 implies the same, as it indicates that 
jurors should look to whether the circumstances presented to the 
defendant a risk that the goods were fake that the buyer did not heed. 
The risk taking, or failure to perceive the risk, for criminal negligence 
must constitute a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the situation.”
166
 This same standard 
is likely to be applied by jurors who have discretion and the power to 
choose not to convict when the visible circumstances—price, quality, 
sale location—do not clearly indicate that there was a risk that an item 
is counterfeit. Thus, there will be a connection between subjective 
culpability and liability for violating Intro 544. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 28(a)(i). 
163 Janet L. Woodka, Sentencing the CEO: Personal Liability of Corporate Executives 
for Environmental Crimes, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 635, 650 (1992). 
164 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
165 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3), (4). 
166 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4) (emphasis added). 
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As legal scholar John L. Diamond explained, negligence does 
involve an inquiry into what a defendant actually knew: 
[a]t bottom, negligence involves a judgment that, based on what the 
actor knew, he or she should have known something else and should 
therefore have known enough to have understood the obligation to 
act more carefully. In spite of its concentration on objective 
components, the baseline for negligence is the context as the actor 
perceived it. Negligence, therefore, involves a subjective inquiry 
(what the actor actually knew about the context) and an object 
inquiry (the inferences that should have been drawn from what the 
actor knew).
167
 
Thus, jurors, insofar as the retributivist theory is correct that persons are 
concerned with punishing wrongdoers, will only find someone guilty of 
a crime if they believe that the person did something wrong by ignoring 
contextual factors that they actually knew of. If a jury concludes that the 
evidence of what the defendant actually knew does not make him 
culpable to some extent, the jury will not convict because a fundamental 
principle of the retribution theory is that punishments are not imposed 
unless the actor is culpable. Indeed, the statute specifically requires the 
jury to consider the contextual information, such as price and sale 
location, that was available to the actor. 
Imposing a criminal penalty in this context is analogous to 
someone who is so intoxicated that they unknowingly get behind the 
wheel and cause an injury. Even though they were too drunk to 
recognize the risk that they were taking by driving, they are still held 
liable because, by choosing to drink in excess, they choose to take a risk 
that they may unknowingly do something harmful when intoxicated. A 
similar principle applies to someone who shops at stores that provide no 
indicia of authenticity of their goods (or outward signs that the goods 
are counterfeit): by purchasing without knowledge of authenticity, they 
take a risk that they could be buying something that is illegal, even if 
they do not know that is the case. 
 
 
167 John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 121 (1997) (citing Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the 
Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessneess, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 549 (1988)). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that there is 
little difference between “he knew” and “he should have known.” William S. Laufer, 
Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L. J. 647, 701-02 (1994) (citing Herbert 
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 128-29 (1968)). 
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Although some may argue that people do not know that they risk 
criminal liability by buying a counterfeit item being sold in such an 
open manner as in Chinatown, ignorance of the law is never a defense 
in criminal law. Thus, although some individuals may not realize that 
buying counterfeit goods is wrong, a campaign to educate the public of 
the harms of the counterfeit goods market and the illegality of buying 
such goods is recommended. In fact, in May 2012, authorities in France 
announced that ten thousand posters would be displayed in the 
country’s eighteen airports to warn tourists of the illegality of 
purchasing counterfeit merchandise.
168
 Similar education campaigns 
have been successfully implemented in the United States to inform 
consumers of the harms and potential liability for purchasing or 
downloading illegally pirated music and movies. What may now not be 
considered morally wrong by the majority of the U.S. population may 
change as a result of an educational campaign. 
Finally, there are crimes in which there is strict liability—liability 
without mens rea—showing that a criminal mens rea is not an 
indispensable element of every criminal offense. Under statutory rape 
laws, for instance, one can be jailed for many years, even if he or she 
did not know that the victim was not of legal age. The punishment for 
that crime is far greater than the maximum penalty imposed by Intro 
544, and the mens rea requirement is less. Thus, Intro 544 would not 
stand alone in imposing criminal punishment without actual knowledge 
that one is doing something wrong. Furthermore, Intro 544 requires 
more than statutory rape laws because it requires a jury to determine a 
defendant’s culpability in the context of surrounding circumstances, 
such as the price and sale location of the goods, whereas statutory rape 
does not. 
VI. The Criminalization of Purchasing Counterfeit Goods 
Comports With Public Policy 
Intro 544 and the criminalization of purchasing counterfeit goods 
comports with public policy. Various members of New York City’s 
government and community condone the city’s recent crusade against 
the counterfeit goods industry. This support indicates that there is a 
need for Intro 544 in the community, and that it will be backed by 
many. Furthermore, Intro 544 furthers various intellectual property law 
 
168 Jada Wong, France Fights Counterfeit Luxury Goods With New Ad Campaign, 
STYLEITE (May 30, 2012), http://www.styleite.com/media/france-anti-counterfeit-ads/#0. 
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goals. Finally, the proposed law simply marks another step in New York 
City’s extensive crusade against the counterfeit goods market. In the 
end, despite any drawbacks, it is clear that the potential positive effects 
outweigh the consequences and favor a passage of Intro 544. 
First, the success of similar laws in France and Italy serve as a 
model for the potential success of Intro 544. Italian and other foreign 
websites warn tourists that both citizens and tourists have been fined, 
typically the maximum amount legally permitted, for purchasing 
counterfeit goods in Italy.
169
 There is no reason not to believe that a 
similar law would not be equally successful in the United States. 
Furthermore, there are signs that the community and authorities will be 
willing to work together to ensure Intro 544’s success. In the wake of 
the most recent arrests in Chinatown in early 2012, Manhattan Borough 
President Scott Stringer, State Senator Daniel Squadron, Councilwoman 
Chin, and officers with the New York Police Department met with 
community members in Chinatown to discuss the incident, during 
which numerous community members expressed confusion about the 
laws against counterfeit goods.
170
 Such transparency and alliance 
between the community and various agencies will increase the 
possibility for success and effectiveness of Intro 544. Moreover, 
although it remains unclear whether or not these foreign laws will 
produce large scale effects down the chain of sale and lead to a decline 
in the manufacturing of counterfeit goods, it is conceivable that 
decreasing consumers’ demand for counterfeit goods will lead to a 
decrease in the supply of these products. Such effects will further 
reinforce the purpose of Intro 544 and similar laws. 
Second, Intro 544 is in line with the goals of intellectual property 
and trademark laws, which seek to protect both trademark owners and 
consumers.
171
 Criminalizing the purchase of counterfeit goods furthers 
the objective to ensure that consumers are not confused by the source of 
goods and are not duped by the quality or price of a good. Intro 544 also 
reinforces a trademark owner’s rights over his mark. It protects the 
mark owner’s economic interests, including the quantity of sales of the 
 
169 Silverman, supra note 140, at 188, 219 (citing Svata Zdenek, Fake Products: 
Foreign Tourists Fined 10.000 € for the Purchase of Goods of Dubious Origin, EUROPEAN 
CONSUMER CTR. PRAGUE (July 31, 2006)); Tourists Warned Over Fake Goods, supra note 
140. 
170 Chan, supra note 110. 
171 S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3-4 (1946), available at 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/trademarks/PreLanhamAct_026_HR_1333.pdf. 
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goods, the competitive price of the goods, and the goodwill the mark 
owner has built-up as the result of time, creative, and economic 
investment. Additionally, one of the most important goals of intellectual 
property law is to create incentives for creation and invention. Intro 544 
reinforces this by reassuring current and future trademark holders that 
their marks and the time and money they spend to develop and 
popularize the mark will not be compromised. The overall effect of this 
betters the public marketplace of not only goods and services, but 
furthers the country’s goals of innovation and creation. These 
intellectual property goals will be protected by the enactment of Intro 
544. As evidenced by the successes of similar laws in France and Italy, 
Intro 544 will curtail the entire counterfeit goods market by dissuading 
consumers from buying counterfeit goods, thereby decreasing the 
demand for counterfeit goods. 
Finally, Intro 544 and its sanctions are in line with increasing 
federal efforts to curtail the counterfeit goods market.
172
 In late 2011, the 
Obama Administration announced its public-education-focused 
campaign against the sale and purchase of counterfeit and pirated 
goods.
173
 At the White House announcement for the campaign, Attorney 
General Eric Holder stated that, “[f]or far too long, the sale of 
counterfeit . . . goods has been perceived as business as usual.”
174
 In 
highlighting the harms of intellectual property crimes, Holder further 
stressed that these crimes “destroy jobs, suppress innovation, and 
jeopardize the health and safety of consumers.”
175
 As part of this 
crusade, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices banded 
together to cooperate in an investigation called Operation In Our Sites.
176
 
On November 28, 2011, Cyber Monday, U.S. officials shut down 150 
domain names of commercial websites allegedly selling counterfeit 
goods; on Cyber Monday 2010, authorities shut down eighty similar 
 
172 Stephanie Clifford, Officials Seize Counterfeit Holiday Goods, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/officials-seize-counterfeit-holiday-
goods.html; Seth Stern, Campaign Against Fake Products Begun by Obama Administration, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/campaign-
against-fake-products-begun-by-obama-administration-1-.html. 
173 Stern, supra note 172. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Terry Frieden, 150 Domain Names Shut Down in Probe of Counterfeit Goods, CNN 
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-28/tech/tech_websites-counterfiet-
goods_1_counterfeit-goods-phony-goods-websites?_s=PM:TECH. 
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websites.
177
 Authorities placed banners on the seized websites to explain 
why the site was shut down in an effort to educate consumers about the 
illegality of selling and purchasing counterfeit goods; in the year that 
followed Cyber Monday 2010, the banners received seventy-seven 
million hits, an indication that the Operation is reaching millions of 
potential consumers.
178
 
Some argue that, if passed, Intro 544 may in fact have detrimental 
effects on the local community in areas of New York City, such as in 
Chinatown, where selling counterfeit goods is common. Because selling 
counterfeit goods along Canal Street is so engrained in the local 
community, wiping out this industry would arguably destroy the 
livelihood of many families. As previously stated, the Counterfeit 
Triangle alone houses (or housed) at least thirty-two shops and employs 
over 150 people.
179
 For these business owners and employees, losing 
their job would be devastating, especially given the current economic 
decline and high unemployment rate. Shutting down counterfeit 
operations in neighborhoods like Chinatown may also have detrimental 
effects on other legitimate businesses in the community, such as 
restaurants, groceries, and legitimate shops. The patronage of not only 
local residents will decrease at these establishments, but also that of 
other New Yorkers and tourists who will no longer have a reason to 
visit the area.
180
 
Despite these fears, the neighborhood will rebound if it indeed 
suffers a decline due to the enactment of Intro 544, and New York City 
will only be better from the further enforcement against counterfeit 
goods. Efforts to assist the neighborhood and its residents who currently 
depend on the counterfeit goods market will aid the local community in 
making the transition. Although there may be an adjustment period, 
New York City, and especially Chinatown, will benefit greatly from 
Intro 544’s successful implementation. 
 
177 Id. The term “Cyber Monday” was invented by a division of the U.S. trade 
association National Retail Federation and was first used in ecommerce in 2005. Robert D. 
Hof, Cyber Monday, Marketing Myth, BUS. WK. (Nov. 29, 2005), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2005/nf20051129_9946_db016.htm. 
This new holiday occurs every year on the Monday after Thanksgiving and Black Friday 
and is one of the biggest online shopping days of the year. Id. 
178 Frieden, supra note 176. 
179 Tucker, supra note 4. 
180 Farley, supra note 112. 
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CONCLUSION 
The counterfeit goods industry is rampant in New York City, and 
Intro 544 is simply another part of the crusade against it. Although some 
may argue that the mens rea term “should have known” creates an 
uncertainty in the legislation that will make Intro 544’s enforcement and 
effectiveness questionable, this is not the case. Based on the successes 
of similar laws in Italy and France, Intro 544 will be an effective, 
enforceable law that will fulfill the retributive and utilitarian goals of 
criminal law. Although its proposal has already garnered negative 
policy attention, Intro 544, bolstered by community support and public 
awareness, will only aid New York City’s campaign against the 
counterfeit goods industry and further the goals of intellectual property 
law. 
 
